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BROWN SHOE: THE GUIDANCE OF A FOOTNOTE
WILLIAM F. ROGERS* AND SANFORD M. LITVACK*
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,1 clearly indicates that Section 7 of the Clayton Act (as
amended in 1950) is the most economically significant antitrust sta-
tute ever to be written into law.
The Brown Shoe decision clarifies two important areas previously
undefined. First, for the purpose of measuring the probable horizontal
effects of a merger of two competing retailers, a city, including its
immediate contiguous surrounding area, exceeding 10,000 in popula-
tion was held to be a "section of the country" within the meaning of
section 7. Second, and of equal significance, was the Court's proscrip-
tions against vertical acquisitions if the acquired company occupies
the position of a potential customer of the acquiring company, par-
ticularly when, as in Brown, this is coupled with (1) a history of no
previous sales to the acquired company in the product market or sub-
market involved and (2) an evidenced intention to conduct such sales.
However, for future guidance in section 7 cases perhaps the most
significant aspect of the decision is suggested by footnote 65 and the
language of the opinion immediately preceding the footnote. Mr. Chief
Justice Warren in describing the criteria to be used in determining
the appropriate relevant geographic market observed:
The fact that two merging firms have competed directly on the
horizontal level in but a fraction of the geographic markets in
which either has operated, does not, in itself, place their merger
outside the scope of § 7. That section speaks of "any.. . section
of the country," and if anti-competitive effects of a merger are
probable in "any" significant market, the merger-at least to
that extent-is proscribed. 65 2
Footnote 65 reads:
To illustrate: If two retailers, one operating primarily in the
eastern half of the Nation, and the other operating largely in the
West, competed in but two mid-Western cities, the fact that the
latter outlets represented but a small share of each company's
business would not immunize the merger in those markets in
which competition might be adversely affected. On the other
hand, the fact would, of course be properly considered in deter-
mining the equitable relief to be decreed. Cf. United States V.
Jerrold Electronics Corp., 180 F. Supp. 545 (D.C.E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
365 U.S. 567. 8
* Associated with Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine.
1. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
2. Id. at 337.
3. Ibid.
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FOOTNOTE 65
Careful consideration of this footnote can provide the practicing
attorney with a means for rendering more precise advice to his clients.
Thus, the footnote suggests that after carefully analyzing the facts
and circumstances of a particular proposed merger, the attorney
should consider the possibility of partial divestiture. For even though
the proposed acquisition might, on its face, have either vertical or
horizontal effects which would be proscribed by section 7, these effects
might be removed by severance, limited divestiture or partial acqui-
sition.
Divestiture is, in itself, drastic relief in an antitrust suit. This is
not to say, of course, that such relief has not been decreed in a number
of antitrust cases. But, in view of the serious economic consequences
which may flow from divestiture, the courts properly are reluctant to
enter such a decree unless the government has shown absolute neces-
sity. Accordingly, courts have sometimes attempted to limit divesti-
ture only to that portion of the assets which is absolutely necessary
to a restoration of competitive conditions. Thus, the Supreme Court,
even in Sherman Act cases, has required the district courts to ascer-
tain which properties were lawfully acquired and which unlawfully.4
While there have not yet been any court decisions involving limited
divestiture in actions brought under amended section 7, the rationale
applied to divestiture in Sherman Act cases would apply with even
greater force to merger actions. Footnote 65 should afford the spring-
board for such applications in the future.
The government's purpose in instituting a civil antitrust action
is not to penalize but rather to remedy. In section 7 cases particu-
larly the goal is restoration of competitive conditions not punishment.
Thus, as has been the rule in equity actions for centuries, the relief
decreed should not exceed the injury claimed.5
The concept of limited divestiture is particularly applicable when
the Government challenges a specific acquisition and, in addition,
itemizes, as part of its complaint, a series of acquisitions dating back
several years. Parenthetically it should be noted that this seems to
have become a popular practice in Antitrust Division complaints.
When the Government claims that the specific acquisition under
attack "pushed" the company into a position in which, when the prior
merger history is also considered, there may be a substantial lessen-
ing of competition or tendency to monopoly, obviously, if divestiture
is necessary at all, the relief need be directed only to the most
4. See, e.g., Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
5. Peck v. Goodberlett, 109 N.Y. 180, 16 N.E. 350 (1888).
6. United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., Civil No. 14130-3, W.D. Mo.,
Nov. 9, 1962; United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).
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recent acquisition. Indeed in United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp.,' the court found that although "the cumulative effect of the
entire series of said acquisitions [was] to foreclose competitors . .. ."
and that "the effect of any future acquisitions may be to substan-
tially lessen competition and to tend to create a monopoly .... ,,,s
nevertheless the appropriate remedy was not divestiture at all but
rather an injunction prohibiting future acquisitions except under cer-
tain circumstances.
Moreover, even in cases when divestiture is deemed necessary, the
divestiture should be limited to the particular acquisition which vio-
lates section 7.
Likewise, if the Government claims that a series of acquisitions
violate section 7, the relief to be accorded should relate only to those
acquisitions which have resulted in the company's exceeding the
boundaries of section 7.
The Federal Trade Commission has recently begun to recognize
this basic rule of logic. In the Foremost Dairies case, in which the
commission counsel had attacked some 52 acquisitions, the Commis-
sion stated:
We have previously rejected the argument under Section 7 that
certain acquisitions in a series of acquisitions, none of which can
be shown to have the adverse effect on competition required by
Section 7, became illegal and may be ordered divested for the
reason that the cumulative effect on competition of these prior
mergers may be such as to make any future acquisition illegal.'0
The Commission, in ordering the divestiture of only ten of the ac-
quired companies, went on to say:
We note, however, that an order requiring respondent to divest
itself of certain corporations will to that extent dissipate the
cumulative effect on competition of all these acquisitions. We
have found that ten of respondent's corporate acquisitions are
illegal and our order will require divestiture of these concerns."
This approach might also apply with equal force when the ac-
quired company consists of several facilities some of which are sus-
ceptible of being divested and maintained as separate effective eco-
nomic units. Under this method the acquiring company might be per-
mitted to retain that portion of the assets which would not, by itself,
7. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), af'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
8. Id. at 572.
9. Foremost Dairies, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 15877 (No. 6495, FTC, 1962).
10. Id. 15877, at 20690.
11. Id. 15877, at 20691. Accord, Luria Bros. & Co., TRADE RE(. REP. % 16299
(No. 6156, FTC, 1963); Union Carbide Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 15503 (No.
6826, FTC, 1961); Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26 (1956).
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FOOTNOTE 65
violate section 7. However, in this regard it should be noted that the
Supreme Court's language in Brown, observing that
. . . [i]f the District Court's characterization of the relevant
market is proper, the number of markets in which both Brown
and Kinney have outlets is sufficiently numerous so that the val-
idity of the entire merger is properly judged by testing its effects
in those markets.12
indicates that when the facilities involved are sufficiently numerous
the merger may be judged as a whole and the relief directed accord-
ingly.
Although the concept of limited divestiture has not yet been applied
by the courts in actions brought under amended section 7, the con-
cept has been recognized by the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission in numerous consent decrees.
According to statistics to be published by the Antitrust Section of
the American Bar Association, out of the 13 cases filed under amended
section 7 which were settled by the Department of Justice by consent
decrees and required any form of divestiture, in only 3 has the Depart-
ment received complete divestiture of the acquired assets or stock; in
the balance only partial divestiture was required. The figures are
equally striking in FTC cases in which the acquiring company was
compelled to divest completely in only 3 out of 14 cases settled by
consent.
While it is fair to assume that the government agencies are willing
to settle for less in a consent decree than they would demand after
trial, nevertheless a great deal may be gleaned from an examination
of some such decrees.
In the Ryder case 1 3 the government attacked the acquisition by
Ryder of the stock or assets of 30 companies which included more than
8,500 vehicles lease contracts, garages and other facilities. The con-
sent decree terminating the action provided that Ryder divest itself
of a total of 400 motor trucks (including lease contracts pertaining to
said trucks) in 5 specified cities. 1 Thus, the defendant was per-
mitted to retain the balance of the stock and assets attacked by the
complaint. Manifestly the government recognized that effective com-
petition could be restored without total divestiture.
12. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 338 (1962).
13. United States v. Ryder System, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. 1 70056 (S.D. Fla.
1961).
14. The district court subsequently modified the judgment to decrease the
number from 400 to 360 and increase the time to sell. United States v. Ryder
System, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 70443 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
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In similar fashion the decree in the Hilton Hotels case 6 provided
for the divestiture of only 3 hotels in 3 separate cities. The complaint
had originally demanded divestiture of approximately 34 hotels in 4
different cities. Thus here, too, the government was willing to limit
its demands and accept partial divestiture sufficient to accomplish the
aims of the lawsuit.
Although there are many other Department of Justice and FTC
cases which, like Ryder and Hilton, did not require complete divesti-
ture, a review of every one is unnecessary. 16
Suffice it to note that the pattern has been, and the trend continues
to be, that the government will consider and accept settlement of
section 7 cases on a partial divestiture basis. This approach in con-
sent decrees might well be carried over, with profit, by the government
to litigated decrees. The courts would likely welcome a refreshing
approach whereby the government limited its divestiture demands to
those believed absolutely necessary. Otherwise, a court might wonder
why the government can accept limited divestiture in a consent decree
but demand total divestiture after trial. The public interest and public
need is the same whether the case is disposed of by consent or trial
since all the government should require is an alleviation of the harm-
ful effects; the relief should be limited to effectuate only that goal.
While footnote 65 suggests the type of relief to be afforded once
suit has been instituted, it also suggests the possibility of severance
at or about the time of the proposed acquisition. This could avoid the
commencement of any action or, at least, preclude a finding of ille-
gality. The severing knife must be skillfully applied to particular
aspects of the business of either the acquired or acquiring corporation
in order to remove the anti-competitive effects. Thus a prohibited
acquisition would be converted into a permissible one. Perhaps the
most facile means for effectuating the desired result would be to place
the assets sought to be severed into a separate division of the corpora-
tion. Having done this the problem of the most appropriate method
of severing the division from the corporation comes to the fore.
Severance of the division from the corporation will, of course, raise
a number of corporate problems concerning the form of the severance,
15. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 68253 (N.D. Ill.
1956).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Suburban Gas, 1962 Trade Cas. 170439 (S.D.
Cal. 1962); United States v. National Homes Corp., 1962 Trade Cas. 70533
(N.D. Ind. 1962); United States v. Hertz Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 69762
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
1960 Trade Cas. 69810 (W.D. Pa. 1960); United States v. Minute Maid Corp.,
1955 Trade Cas. 68131 (S.D. Fla. 1955); Continental Baking Co., FTC Did.
No. 7880 (1962); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7973 (1961);
Diamond Crystal Salt Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7323 (1960).
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FOOTNOTE 65
the timing involved, the nature of the consideration received and the
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.'7 While severance of the
division from the corporation may be accomplished by many means,
consideration of the following methods will suffice to exemplify some
essential problems:
(1) New subsidiary formed by the corporation and assets of
the division transferred to it, and the securities of the new sub-
sidiary distributed to shareholders of the corporation.
(2) New subsidiary formed as in (1), but the securities thereof
sold for cash, other securities or assets or a combination thereof.
(3) Sales of assets of the division.
Alternative (1) lacks appeal, since it will constitute a partial liqui-
dation of the corporation and therefore is not apt to be attractive to
the management of the corporation. 8 Further, if the securities of
the corporation are closely held, this method may not solve the anti-
trust problems.
Turning to the more complicated alternatives (2) and (3), it is
clear that a sale for cash of the securities of a subsidiary consisting
of the division, or a sale for cash of the division's assets presents no
unusual corporate problems. Negotiations will, of course, arise as to
representations and warranties made by the corporate seller.
The acquisition of assets in exchange for the stock or assets of the
division or an exchange of assets for the division's assets, is substan-
tially more complicated. Thus, the nature and description of the assets
being acquired or disposed of, liens thereon and title thereto, payment
of current real estate taxes, assignment of patents, trade marks, trade
names and like matters incident to a sale or purchase of assets consti-
tuting a part of a going concern, are complicated, but no more so than
the usual sale or acquisition of assets.
In the event all, or substantially all, (and in some cases, a substan-
tial part or an integral part) of the assets of a corporation are to be
sold incident to the severance of the division or the acquisition of
assets in exchange therefor, the applicable state statutes must be
reviewed; many states require an approving vote of stockholders for
such a sale.' 9 If the selling corporation's stock is "listed" on a Na-
tional Securities Exchange, a proxy statement will be necessary to
solicit proxies, in compliance with section 14 of the Securities Act of
17. 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(aa) (1958).
18. Alternative (1), in addition to simplicity, has the advantage of not requir-
ing compliance with the Securities Act of 1933 since a dividend is not deemed a
"sale" under § 2 (3) of that act because the transaction is not deemed an offer or
male "for value." 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 517-18 (2d ed. 1961).
19. In New York a two-thirds favorable vote is required with right of appraisal
to dissenters. N.Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 20.
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1934.20 Thus the rules of the applicable stock exchange must also be
reviewed.
Even when, as noted, the method for severance has been deter-
mined, the parties must still consider the timing of the severance and
the consideration to be furnished.
The timing of the disposition of the division will call for careful
consideration and probably consultation with the purchaser. It would,
of course, be less complicated if the severance of the division could
be accomplished prior to the date of its sale. However, since the con-
sideration received upon the sale is related to the demands and wishes
of the purchaser, in most cases it will be feasible to make only a ten-
tative severance of the division prior to its actual sale. Therefore, the
actual sale of the division will, in all probability, take place at or
about the same time as the proposed merger.
In addition, apart from the usual wish of the purchaser to acquire
assets (in order to permit future depreciation charges thereon), the
form of the consideration to be received for the division, if other than
cash, will be an important factor affecting the antitrust aspects of
the contemplated severance. Thus, if securities represent the entire
consideration or a substantial part thereof, attention must be given
to the type of securities to be delivered. Clearly, debt securities will
raise fewer problems since they will not carry with them any voting
rights, and, preferably, will not be secured by any mortgage on the
assets sold or a pledge of any voting securities. If corporate stock is
delivered as consideration for the sale of the division the problem of
affiliation of the purchaser and the seller will arise. The transfer of
a substantial amount of the voting stock of the purchaser may vitiate
the over-all object sought to be accomplished by the sale of the divi-
sion. The corporation would then have substantial voting power and
the antitrust problems might still be present.
The effect of the Securities Act of 1933 should be remembered
throughout the negotiations. Where securities are received as part of
the consideration for the sale of the division, the corporation may or
may not wish to retain these securities as part of its assets. If the
corporation contemplates a resale of these securities, the Securities
Act of 1933 will be applicable and registration under that act will be
required unless the securities are privately placed with a very limited
number of purchasers from the corporation who clearly are taking for
investment. In the event these subsequent purchasers make a public
distribution of the securities purchased, the corporation will be an
"underwriter" under the Act of 1933 and have the liabilities attrib-
20. 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1958).
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FOOTNOTE 65
uted thereto,21 including the danger of participating in a criminal
violation22 of the act, namely, the public distribution of securities
without exemption or registration under that act. Therefore, if secu-
rities are taken by the corporation, it should, if possible, persuade the
issuer to register these securities under the Securities Act of 1933.
Prior to making even a tentative severance of the division, consider-
ation must, of course, be given to the tax consequences. The tax con-
sequences to the selling corporation and to the purchaser may force
the form of severance to follow prescribed and artificial maneuvers.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Brown Shoe is a landmark in the antitrust field. The
case will undoubtedly be cited and recited, applied and misapplied,
distinguished and compared but certainly not ignored. Perhaps, as
some have suggested, the opinion leaves more questions unanswered
than answered. Nevertheless it may well be that in the long run the
implications of footnote 65 will have the most significant impact on
future antitrust litigation. The words of the Court can act as a guide
to the practicing attorney in advising clients in the future. The Court
has suggested a means whereby the skillful attorney may either be
able to transform an otherwise illegal merger into one which would
not violate section 7 and avoid suit or, once suit has been commenced,
effectuate a settlement which will not require total and complete dives-
titure. Thus the terms "severance, limited divestiture, and partial
acquisition" may well become basic ingredients of every attorney's
vocabulary when considering a proposed merger.
21. Failure to register [48 Stat. 78, 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) (1958)] imposes civil
liabilities [68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1958)] on the "seller" of the
securities, with right of rescission by the purchaser for a three year period [48
Stat. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77(m) (1958)].
22. Penalties--48 Stat. 87, 15 U.S.C. § 77(x) (1958).
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